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Abstract
Economics depends heavily on assumptions made about the phenomenon of institu-
tional variety and its implications for technological capabilities in economic develop-
ment. This article contributes to new ways of thinking of institutional variety in order to
advance scientific argument within the broad tradition of evolutionary political econ-
omy (EPE). First, it draws on the Nyāya (Hindu) systems of logic and reasoning about
inference and judgement which can potentially reveal inter-and intra-paradigmatic
differences for EPE and economics. Second, it uses four brief illustrative cases from
the author’s development research on technological learning and innovation to argue
for more explicit and systematic treatment of inference and judgement about institu-
tional variety. Implications for the future of economics are briefly discussed.
Keywords Technology.Development . Institutions . Inference .Economics .Evolutionary
political economy . Evolutionary economics
JEL classification B41 EconomicsMethodology . D02 Institutions: Design,
Formation, Operations, and Impact . O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic
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1 Introduction
Despite substantial debate and dissent, the process of development in economics
is seen with some considerable consensus as one of institutional change,
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especially the change of dominant institutions such as markets. Economic
historians and economic development scholars, however, have recognized that
development involves phenomena which may not be easily recognizable within
existing conceptual frameworks nor reconciled into empirical patterns or policy
clarity that can be easily extended from already industrialized economies. For
example, the process of industrial development, and with it the wide and varied
attempts by firms and states of technological learning and innovation, reveals
considerable institutional variety.
Implicit in the policy advice is recognizing some institutional variation, yet
viewing the transformation of economies as processes of inevitable institu-
tional convergence or of dominant institutions such as markets becoming more
“perfect.” In this sense, development economics has been an arena of consid-
erable dissent about the microeconomic assumptions of institutional change
and the narrow reading of markets. Furthermore, policy advice from develop-
ment agencies can push countries to mimic those of industrialized economies
from several decades earlier, such as South Korea, or suggest to democracies
that authoritarian transitions may be copied.
The stakes are high for countries to manage their institutional change
process, but also for economics to justify how it infers such change from
situations where considerable variety exists. This paper provides a preliminary
conceptual approach by asking how one might reconcile different theoretical
frameworks about institutional variety under the umbrella of evolutionary
political economy (EPE). What inferences can be drawn from the phenomena
of variety of institutions such as markets and firms? Development economics
is a study of phenomena dependent on inferences about institutional variety
and its consequences for technological capabilities and development. Using
four brief composite cases drawing from the author’s development research,
the paper focuses on the conceptual frameworks and taxonomy of inference
and judgment in economics. How, why, and what scholars differently infer
from the phenomena of institutional variety matters to economics and to
theories and policies of technological capabilities, especially for learning and
innovation in industrial advance. The paper lays out the argument that more
systematic treatment within evolutionary political economy, across frameworks
for innovation and learning, can advance the field of development and
economics.
The next section outlines in more detail the scientific process of econom-
ics, the potential advantages of drawing from alternate systems of inference
such as the Nyaya school that well predates Cartesian thinking and the
opportunity presented by revealing such assumptions of inference and judg-
ment in evolutionary political economy (EPE). Section 3 then details the
specific intra-paradigmatic conceptual context of institutional variety. The
example used is the study of technological learning and innovation literature
regarding economic development in “late” industrial nations. Section 4 pre-
sents four brief cases to further a taxonomy of intra-paradigmatic challenges
in the evolutionary political economy tradition. Section 5 derives from the
four development cases to discuss potential benefits of EPE for economics’
advance.
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2 Economics’ inference challenge from institutional variety
Kuhn (1962) famously framed science’s evolution through paradigms as competition
between hypotheses and heavily mediated by a community of science practice to
resolve the rules of evidence by which one hypothesis and its paradigms were deemed
superior. The advance of competing hypotheses then establishes a sequence of possible
dominant theories at any time, with contemporaneous hypotheses struggling to estab-
lish alternate paradigms and methodologies. Contemporary development economics
can benefit from this form of explicit attention to paradigm-construction and theory
evolution. However, economics poorly fits the Kuhnian perspective of strictly compet-
ing hypothesis resolution and neither seems to denote “revolution” nor “normal”
science (Baumberger 1977). Rather, contested communities of practice, mainstream
and heterodox, remain without a shared understanding of the relationships between
phenomena, methods, inference, and hypothesis development. Lee (2012), for example,
differentiates an economics that can engage diverse extant theoretical views across
paradigms, and is able to learn from the history of economic thought, policy engage-
ment, and theoretical changes. This proclivity to source from phenomena is a charac-
teristic of science, but the ability to engage in cross-paradigmatic theory building may
be distinctive to “heterodox” or “pluralist” economic traditions such as evolutionary
political economy (EPE) (Dequech 2007; Dow 2008; Lee 2012).
Development study in economics may thus benefit using the lens of the
pluralist tradition of evolutionary political economy (EPE) to engage in inter-
paradigmatic and intra-paradigmatic theory construction especially around the
phenomena of institutional variety. Variety broadly can be characterized as “the
number of actors, activities, and objects necessary to characterize the economic
system” (Saviotti 2001, 120), and can be manifested in new products, sectors, and
productivity growth in existing sectors (ibid.). The variety of “actors, activities,
and objects” is held together in economic activity by institutions, which constitute
a range of norms and rules through which human societies function. From a
development standpoint, economics must contend with multiple ways in which
these institutions are constituted, i.e., institutional variety, and so must the design
of development policy. A one-size-fits-all development policy is a misnomer.
Therefore, an explanation of the existence of institutional variety cannot rely on
ex-post analysis to contrast industrialized and industrializing economies (Arocena
and Sutz 2000). Institutional variety has no single interpretation across major
schools. While growth theories treat the growth of variety as an ex-post product
of economic development, requiring little explanation, Schumpeterians see in-
stitutional variety as central to economic development (Saviotti 2001). Similar-
ly, for labor economists, the explanation for the large variation in types of work
(often termed “informal”) is sharply distinct in economics based on how the
political economy and social custom of regulation of industrial work itself is
framed (e.g., Portes et al. 1989 versus Maloney 2004). Therefore, open ques-
tions regarding the empirical reality of firms and regulation remain. However,
rather than beginning with incommensurate paradigms, the phenomena of vari-
ety in real-world engagement can drive theory construction and policy framing
in turn: under what conditions is institutional variety “good” for development
policy? Does it disappear as countries converge on GDP per capita? What
15Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (2020) 1:13–35
policy environments sustain such variety? Relevant for this paper, can the wider
conceptual umbrella of EPE be used systematically to help us advance the
discipline of economics?
Extending Saviotti (2001), but also scholars such as North, institutional variety
can be defined as “a variety in the norms, customs, and rules through which the
economy functions.” These norms, customs, and rules may be national policies or
laws within which firms function, “softer” attributes of how firms work (e.g.,
creativity, implicit norms of discrimination, reward for innovation), as well as
international context of technical standards of trade or intellectual property har-
monization rules. Furthermore, organizational variety (size and nature of firms, for
example) can be viewed as a subset of institutional variety since organizations also
embody implicit or explicit norms, customs, and rules through which the economy
functions. While the existence of institutional variety may be agreed upon, no
such consensus in economics arguably exists for studying and inferring from
single or multiple institutions. In large part, this gap in theorizing is both a cause
and effect of studying some dominant institutions such as markets but neglecting
others such as the state or its strategic policies or key stakeholders, e.g., industry
associations or universities (Papaioannou and Srinivas 2019; Arocena and Sutz
2000). The paradigmatic core of “mainstream” economics has focused on markets
as a primary institution and explanatory variable although developing countries
have an especially complex variety of economic activity and breadth of firms
(Srinivas 2012; Srinivas 2018a). Variety matters because institutional change does
not occur singly. Combinations of institutions matter; the institutional variety
includes both markets and other institutions, requiring combinatorics (Amable
2000) and heuristics (Srinivas 2012). Srinivas (2012) distinguishes between insti-
tutional “menageries” and “zoos.” The former were repositories of exotic fauna
but enjoyed only as private collections of exotica and splendor, while “zoos” were
for public display and access, and furthered the goals of research and education.
Economics must open up its institutional variety, especially its market menageries,
to closer scrutiny.
The lack of clarity regarding institutional variety is intimately tied to observation and
subsequent inference and judgment. Dow (2009) surmises that exercises in judgment
are lacking in curricula and result in economists somewhat haphazardly facing the real-
world scenarios they must inevitably comment upon: “The nature of judgment is
seldom discussed in economics, yet clearly it is critical for economists in practice when
applying what they have learnt to real-world situations. It is important therefore that
economics education should equip students by training them in judgment. This requires
that the curriculum cover different types of argumentation and exercises in putting them
together in order to arrive at a coherent conclusion.” (Dow 2009, 48). Yet, inference
does not proceed to judgment without hiccups. Judgment itself follows prior skills,
which are equally if not more neglected, including awareness of phenomena and
subsequent inference. Establishing pathways to judgment requires attention to personal
knowledge especially that in answer to judgements that inevitably must evolve in
response to religion. Michael Polanyi, scientist, in response to deepening interest in
Christian theological inquiry devised his own philosophical question of judgment and
evidence from the standpoint of personal knowledge versus universals: “All knowledge
is… either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing”, rejecting a Cartesian comprehensive or
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universal doubt, yet stating: “We must form our convictions, knowing their limitations,
and do the best we can”, while later discussing “Intelligence and Responsibility” for an
approach to action (Scott 2005, 9, 11).
In order to tackle uncertainty about the inferential foundations of the discipline,
preceding characteristics of exposure to phenomena matter. Judgment requires other
capabilities including perception itself, self-awareness, awareness of surroundings,
contextual clues, sensitivity to social norms, and heightened self-confidence of ignoring
the busy mind when required to attend to sensory inputs or consciousness-raising
approaches in unfamiliar surroundings. In some respects, one can frame this process
as going deep rather than going wide, becoming more confident that a phenomenon
exists, is worthy of conjecture, and the ability to compare and contrast it with other
phenomena that can be described as distinct or related.
The striving to develop an alternate, more precise approach to human knowledge
and inference has established economics roots in Cartesian inquiry especially the
emphasis on rationality and logic, but the worsening narrow psychological and behav-
ioral character of homo economicus, overextended without sufficient attention to man’s
inner nature. Western (especially Greek) philosophy’s selective impact on economics
has further generated a distinctive historical path for inference and moral political
economy’s separation of scholarly disciplines from theology to neuroscience, and
economics to psychology. However, older systems exist, written out of much academic
scholarship on critical thinking and logic and pigeon-holed into area studies, ignoring
their unique and powerful contribution to training in making inferences and leading to a
public philosophy relevant to social challenges (Vaidya 2017). Specifically, these
systems of the philosophy and science of knowledge and its sources, pramāṇa-śāstra
(in the language of Sanskrit or Saṃskṛtam), seen in the six Vedic schools of Sanatana
Dharma (Hinduism) offer more promising detailed logical and psychological bases of
inference and judgment for EPE. Specifically, the Nyāya school (~ 2 BCE) pivots on
fundamental questions of sources of knowledge and institutions (rules, norms, laws).
The six schools and particularly Nyāya precede and reconcile the role of framing, the
psychological basis for inference, and the difficulty of using inference to convince
others of interpretation and, by extension, to judgment. Importantly, traditional sepa-
ration of Western scholarly disciplines (e.g., economics, psychology) is not followed.
More expansive questions can be pursued through logic, experiment, and example,
such as whether the objects of perception are internal or external to one’s conscious-
ness, or voluntary and reliable as sources of knowledge (see also Dasti 2013). Nyāya
philosophy situates judgment within the context of the concern with wrong knowledge
leading to delusion, with specific concepts such as Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna
(inference, mediated knowledge), and Vyā’pti (invariable relation). These are set firmly
against the backdrop of observation and consciousness.
Briefly drawing on these alternate logics and methods, a possible viewpoint is
that disciplinary disagreements in economics arise from disagreements of vyā’pti,
the invariable relation between two facts. The Vedanta School similarly offers
significant contributions to the practice of disinterested witnessing and its impact
on phenomenology. A full exposition is impossible here, but even evolutionary
political economy approaches may recognize similar but not equal or complete
phenomena: strictly, vyā’pti is difficult to establish. Especially relevant is the
clear difference between svārthānumāna or parārthānumāna, or inference for
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one’s personal convictions (what Polanyi may call personal knowledge) and that
required to convince others, having different burdens of proof of knowledge. In
other words, while the mainstream and more pluralist traditions can be seen as
unconvinced of the parārthānumāna that the others seek to establish, they may
within their own “camp” (EPE itself in this case being a wide enough umbrella)
be ready to extend the conversation of what propositions are shared or sufficient
in order to be convinced. Consequently, it may be valuable to note that econom-
ics’ institutional analyses may draw on widely varying roots in philosophical
traditions of consciousness and cognition, resulting in diverse historical and
cultural approaches to development phenomena and in stark contrast to industri-
alized (Western) patterns. These phenomenology roots may generate conflicting
views of what is seen even when the formal institutions of a society (national
laws or ideas of justice) may be shared. However, in order to develop such
propositions and confidence in the basis of knowledge, conditional though it
may be, it requires exposure and debate of what phenomena mean to pratyaksha,
or perception.
Yet, economics departments unlike policy schools unevenly expose students to
diverse methods of “fieldwork” or primary data collection, lessening the scope of the
phenomena they are exposed to and ability to reconcile multiple viewpoints about
single phenomena. “Minor” professions with professional engagement in the real
world, such as social work or planning and policy, do this much better, where
dependence on dogmatic disciplines is arguably less absolute and pedagogy includes
methods of professional practice of interpretation, mediation, and reconciliation (Glazer
1974). These professions have curricular emphasis on observation, problem-framing,
and problem-solving. Similarly, other Vedic schools alert one to phenomena and
perception, but also false knowledge and a means of liberation. Observation precedes
data collection, requires slowing down, of attention to the context of consciousness in
which observable phenomena are resolved into cognitive frames of reference, then to
response and inference and its pathways to diverse conclusions. When analysis of
similar phenomena results in different inferences about institutional variety, only some
may develop into systematic hypotheses in the service of scientific enquiry. In other
words, the discipline of economics has not systematically resolved types of agreement,
its foundational propositions about complex phenomena, vyā’pti (the relation) and
anumāna (inference). Thus, it remains unconvincing within its boundaries at least in
part because it lacks a consensus approach to convincing others in the discipline (what
the Nyāya school calls the challenge of parārthānumāna).
Consequently, while they have many shared attributes, there is nothing neatly tied
up within economics about how inference and the exercise of judgment then proceed to
interpretation of the economy. That inference precedes judgment offers a challenge
inherent to economics’ education (Dow 2009), yet long periods of economics advance
may not resolve, either through co-existence or revolution, what the discipline’s
foundations, approach to invariant relations, or sources of knowledge may be.
Baumberger (1977, 10): “In a sense, economics provides the counter-example par
excellence to physics. But, as does physics, it fails to illustrate and support Kuhn’s
schema. Whereas in physics we look in vain for the period of the revolutionary mode of
behavior, in economics we are at a loss to find the period of the normal science mode of
behavior.” More specifically, a “physics-imitation complex” devoid of context and
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inference makes traditional economists struggle to read different types of historical
data, or expand beyond routine methods. The discipline added stochastic terms to
constrained optimization formulae instead of focusing on reformulation from what
stochastic behavior meant for theory, which physics had successfully done, “[…] these
stochastic “shocks” had little or no theoretical justification, but themselves seemed only
an excuse to maintain the pure deterministic ideal of explanation in the face of massive
disconfirming evidence.” (Mirowski 1990, 291). Competing hypotheses are not fairly
resolved in mainstream economics, or over-generalized, hoping for a “grand unified
theory,” and lacking “historical specificity” (Hodgson 2002) EPE scholarship can
contribute to scientific clarity by making more evident its own inter-paradigmatic as
well as intra-paradigmatic inferences, and the propositions required to convince others
under the same umbrella.
3 Technological learning and innovation: toward a conceptual
taxonomy
A discussion regarding inference about institutional variety provides a way to move
between schools of thought even in more pluralist traditions, as we will see, on the
issue of technological learning and innovation, perhaps what in the older Vedic and
Nyāya tradition in particular could be termed Upamāna or proceeding through com-
parison and analogy, which forms a valid basis for conditional knowledge. For
instance, the history of economic thought and long-arc narrative explanations for
theories of growth (such as of Gerschenkron 1962) center their explanations as explicit
interpretations of institutional change (Lee 2012; McCloskey 1983). In Gerschenkron’s
(1962) schema, industrialization is a process of institutional change that is state-led;
institutions such as finance and banking are created by the state to drive industrial
development. Each “late” industrial nation may weave this state-led institutional mix in
different ways. Each institutional mix offers a difficult brew of learned “social capa-
bilities” (Abramovitz 1986) that delivers developmental goals in industrial transforma-
tion. The institutional variety is recognized in the long arc as essential to explanations
of technological capabilities and draws on an essentially evolutionary political econo-
my of learning. Ambiguity between the political economy traditions may reflect
important differences of units and scales: for example, that GDP growth is best viewed
through industry sector growth, or manufacturing value addition, or even learning
within certain types of firms or across tasks, products or platforms. Amsden (1989)
for example argues that what the World Bank termed the East Asian “Miracle” of
laissez faire was rather systematic state intervention that accelerated the building of
technological capabilities and of specific types of learning for national firms. Thus,
within innovation and learning scholarship, while broadly consistent with EPE, there
are important differentiating assumptions about units of analysis (e.g., nation-states
versus firms), protagonists (e.g., indigenous firms versus multinationals, NGOs or
universities), and more frequently mixed methods (e.g. diverse qualitative case studies,
simulations, agent-based modeling). However, despite these differences, EPE has
several intra-paradigmatic advantages for economics: evolutionary theories have a
distinctive advantage in “the explanation of situations characterized by qualitative
change, radical uncertainty, and the heterogeneity of agents and techniques” (Saviotti
19Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (2020) 1:13–35
1997). The variety generated by these different conditions and responses by agents
provides the basis for institutional theories of the dynamics of change versus those of
order (Dosi and Orsenigo 1988; Nelson and Winter 1982). However, no single
framework of evolutionary economics is easily able to contend with this heterogeneity
either to explain order or change (Robert et al. 2017).
Variety bridges those approaches focused on modeling without qualitative change
and those that are more descriptive approaches of variety in economic development
(Saviotti 1994): e.g., Kuznets (1965) on agriculture and industry dynamics; Romer
(1987) on growth of capital goods; and Pasinetti’s (1981, 1993) saturation of demand
as a limit to variety and growth (see Saviotti 2001, 121). Institutional variety can be
inferred to be either central or tangential to economic development processes; for
example, the phenomena of “informal” work and firms can be variously analyzed
based on combinations of institutions in terms of capitalist exploitation, of dualism, of
regulation and free markets, or agility and entrepreneurship. The meso-level analysis of
institutional variety may result in udharana (examples) with applications in economic
geography such as cluster development analysis, where institutional variety can prompt
movement toward integration mechanisms (Grillitsch and Asheim 2017).
EPE can better reveal this breadth and ponder the hurdles to reconciliation. For
example, Schumpeterian frameworks for innovation and learning are likely to assert
that institutional variety matters to the engine of innovation and entrepreneurship
because it endogenizes the bi-directionality of entrepreneurship and investment
financing (Dewick and Hernandez 2014). Yet, the division between institutional
and organizational variety that can be presumed to be both evident and positive for
innovation may not be so clear for wider development, if the coordinating mecha-
nisms are less clearly understood or altogether absent (e.g., Mehaut et al. 2010;
Pascha et al. 2011).
4 Methodology: taxonomy development of institutional variety
Rather than a traditional methodology of application or evaluation which can be built
on foundations of some certainty, this section focuses on the ontology and epistemol-
ogy of taxonomy development in how institutional variety can be approached. The
question of inference and judgment is the centerpiece of greater explanatory precision.
Differentiating between competing hypotheses in economics, even within intra-
paradigmatic communities such as EPE, is not driven by agnostic methods (Hodgson
2002). A narrative whose core is a phenomenon of heterogeneity necessarily ap-
proaches the task through “colligation” from the history of science (Roberts 1996)
which attempts to generate frameworks of explanation and a general hypothesis from
seemingly mismatched heterogeneous phenomena (see Dumez and Jeunemaitre 2006,
also comparison and analogy of Upamāna). In both Western philosophy and Vedic,
such comparison becomes a system of resolution also evident in creating law. For
instance, differentiating between industrial pathways and their institutional variety
opens up the black box of nomenclature and policy legitimacy such as that of the
“Global South,” which has succeeded in emphasizing developmental solidarity but
ceased to have much analytic power to study the specifics of technological learning and
innovation (Srinivas 2018b). Such comparison and analogy offer early approaches to
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narrative strengthening, and are consistent with the Kuhnian notion that paradigms in
“normal science”may be incommensurate. For economics, this translates into the inability
of empirical (quantitative) strategies to differentiate between theories, of persistence in the
use of mathematics as the primary means of resolution between arguments, and the need
of building arguments beyond mathematics (see Dow (2009, 46-48)).
As we have discussed, in the different systems of reasoning show, the development
of knowledge about phenomena is premised on how one makes viable assumptions
about the validity of inference for reliable judgment. A system of propositions, either
partial or whole, defines how personal experience and inference (what Polanyi terms
tacit knowledge) might be related also to that with which we can convince others (in the
Nyāya school, the sarvānumāna versus parārthānumāna) Furthermore, even where
comparable foundations may be assumed, new relations (Vyā’pti) can be elaborated
perhaps only in a single direction, or without preferred propositions intact. In econom-
ics, the divide between mainstream versus more pluralist traditions is less important
than the pragmatic and possibly even progressive principle that inquiry can advance
even among those that largely agree.
Four cases from the author’s published research are briefly presented to demonstrate
how phenomena may be classified and studied. We proceed with three assertions to
analyze narratives in more detail.
Assertion 1: Institutional variety in industrial development is a phenomenon requir-
ing conceptual frameworks and methods from which inference is made more explicit.
Assertion 2: Institutional variety is contested within evolutionary political economy
(EPE) approaches.
Assertion 3: An intermediate taxonomy with the use of simple visual and qualitative
heuristics can lay bare inference and judgment about innovation and learning.
The 4 brief cases represent different levels of analysis from nation-state to product
innovation.
4.1 Case 1: Institutional variety across industrializing nation-states
Economic development history has underscored the diversity of national path-
ways. The nation-state offers a major context for inference about institutional
variety, and particularly post-colonial nation-building points to the difficulty of
embracing an industrially homogenous or necessarily politically cohesive “Global
South” (Srinivas 2018b). The framers of the diverse national industrial plans
sought to present political alliances such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
as the basis of breakaway from the Cold War. NAM’s claim of national develop-
ment autonomy presented a new front for global legitimacy.
Post-colonial nation-building indeed generated some shared patterns of development
such as land held by a minority, displacement and precariousness of work, and
divisions enhanced during colonial rule, of language, religion, and income. Pivotal
historical moments such as the Bandung conference in 1955 underscored that while
some types of political solidarity may have been aspirational for NAM in theory,
members in practice sought diverse policy approaches and driving concepts from their
economic advisors. Macro-level goal-setting and policy agenda-setting were sourced
from Marx to Rostow, Mahalanobis, Solow or Lewis without clear implications for
21Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (2020) 1:13–35
institutional variety or learning. Lewis (1954) for instance does offer propositions for
“learning islands” and unlimited supplies of labor and begins with variety in labor
practices, but does not make explicit assertions for why institutional variety exists or
grows in the context of different learning types.
Given the limited range of stated political allegiances of NAM members, economic
development pathways were surprisingly prolific. NAM nations broke away among
themselves and from traditional Cold War militarization and the polarization through
distinctive decisions on investment, diversification, specialization, and technology trans-
fer. Solidarity priorities mostly remained in the realm of disarmament, environmental
improvements, reduced racial discrimination, as well as indigenous and human rights
(Berger 2001; Tan and Acharya 2008; Nesadurai 2005). “Panchsheel” (the 5 pillars, April
28, 1954) elaborated by India as an important leader within the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) and allies such as Ghana, Egypt, Indonesia, and the former Yugoslavia, sought for
consensus of “mutual co-existence” with non-aggression, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual non-aggression, and peaceful co-
existence. Value priorities for nation-building differently affected the character of domes-
tic economic realities of trade and technology transfer and the degree to which techno-
logical learning and innovation capabilities were prioritized relative to more rudimentary
imports. Contrasting elements of “Panchsheel” were interpreted in the New International
Economic Order and initiated by several NAMmembers in the 1970s through the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The splits evident earlier
resulted in different industrial paths, dramatically different technological capabilities
60 years later, and dynamic membership of diverse geopolitical clubs: “[…] uniform
‘Southern’ qualities were clearly analytically insufficient [..] to explain breakaway coun-
tries and regions” (Srinivas 2018b). NAM members strengthened the United Nations’
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), but differed sharply in their continued alliances
with Cold War powers and strategic use of such market opportunities offered by them.
South Korea, neither a NAM member nor a close ally at the UN, arguably benefited
significantly from US-tied market access agreements.
While some NAM members such as India and China developed important industrial
strengths, others split their memberships across various technology transfers, trade
pacts, and investment clubs. International political economy constructed on “Third
World” analysis of development rests on situating NAM countries within Cold War
origins. It often selectively uses dependency theses and offers a mixed picture of
Bandung’s importance today, unable to explain the institutional variety within and
outside NAM as a function of technological learning and innovation. Rather than
multiple pathways or technology choices available “off-the-shelf” and costless in
learning to all countries, the technological capability literature emphasizes how knowl-
edge and technology transfer contests were deeply constrained. Only those nations that
have existing capabilities and dynamic firms, and regulatory and policy environments
that are relatively agile at any given moment, are able to enter into global networks and
supply chains, or decisively manage their self-reliance and autonomy.
This systemic view of learning is in direct contrast to traditional “Third World”-ism
and national industrial analyses, which can provide fewer answers to institutional
variety across countries, industries, and within countries. Furthermore, dominant finan-
cial architectures of investment and donor priorities have both appeared to support
“North”-“South” classifications of countries and argue for post-colonial or
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industrializing similarities, rather than overt attention to divergence. Fluid geopolitical
membership exposes some of the classification challenges for national institutional
bundles. Brazil and South Korea, two industrial archetypes and outside the traditional
NAM club nevertheless share many similarities. The overlapping clubs have prolifer-
ated (Table 1).
In more recent years, it has seemed difficult to reconcile early solidarity or Cold War
alliances as the basis for a shared future. Asian and Latin American clusters of different
direction and scope have proved resilient to easy conclusions about development. They
have thrived in different periods of dynamism and are best explained through institu-
tional variety and how these environments were managed (Rasiah and Vinanchirachi
2012). Furthermore, the focus on potentially divergent institutional pathways can take
evolutionary analysis into ambiguous evolutionary political economy terrain about
development. Even more explicit controversy brews in addressing local production
and innovation capabilities. Development has often been posed as a learning and
“catch-up” process. Can Schumpeterian frameworks, which focus on production and
innovation, help? This is the focus of the next case.
4.2 Case 2: Institutional and organizational variety in neo-Schumpeterian
perspectives
Rather than uniquely controlled through national, centralized plans as the Bandung
debate is inevitably framed, in fact institutional variety is inherent to the national
project because of the various sub-systems of innovation dynamically changing and
Table 1 Geopolitical club memberships
Country “Origin World”
of national development
Select trade
bloc/club memberships
Cuba Second World (Marxist-Leninist,
single party) NAM
G77
India Third World, NAM (socialist
mixed-market republic,
parliamentary democracy)
G20, G77, BRICS, emerging
economy, “Enhanced Engagement”
Country EEC/OECD
Brazil Third World (NAM observer only) G20, G77, BRICS, emerging
economy, EEC/OECD
Thailand Third World (constitutional Monarchy,
and former military leader elected
Prime Minister), NAM
G20, G77, BRICS, emerging
economy, OECD, ASEAN
Indonesia Third World (Military-led), NAM G20, G77, BRICS, emerging
economy, EEC/OECD ASEAN
Egypt Third World (Military-led, later
democracy) NAM
G77
South Korea Third World (capitalist; Military-led,
later democracy)
G20, OECD, ASEAN
Chile Third World (capitalist; presidential
democracy now), NAM
OECD, G20, G77 (only OECD
member exception)
Source: Adapted from Srinivas (2018b). Memberships are fluid
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actively steered at national, sub-national, and sectoral levels. Micro-level data show that
industry sectors adopt different routes that help in part to build theoretical frameworks
e.g., Innovation Systems (Malerba and Nelson 2012). While it is evident that theoretical
constructs for innovation can be rooted in different assumptions about economic
activity and use different methodologies, the history of economic thought can show
why. From the diverse assumptions in economics of Smith, Marshall, and Schumpeter,
for example, have come considerably starkly different approaches to differences
between Innovation Systems frameworks and those of Self-Organization or Cumulative
Causation for example (Robert and Yoguel 2016). While each recognizes institutional
variety, their explanations vary on how the variety emerges and is resolved in the
institutional context. In most growth models, qualitative change is recognized but only
accommodated ex-post (Saviotti 1997); in innovation systems, institutional variety as a
part of this qualitative change is treated ex-post which is developmentally problematic
because it cannot explain ex-ante intervention nor explain the conditions under which
institutional variety may be good for development, i.e., “innovation systems” as a
product of analyzing industrialized economics may be normatively driven (Arocena
and Sutz 2000).
Since the early 2000s, considerable dissent of this nature has emerged about
development and inequality and especially the role of the state and of variety in
market institutions even with those studies with Schumpeterian sensibilities (e.g.,
Arocena and Sutz 2000; Srinivas and Sutz 2008; Chataway et al. 2014; Kaplinsky
2011). Economics has explained the rates of growth and nature of institutions since
the 1950s until the 1980s using varied lenses of institutional change with more
traditional assumptions about technology, knowledge, and learning (e.g., Marx and
Lewis (1954)), while from the 1980s, more overt evolutionary analyses in both
state-led neo-Marxian political economy and neo-Schumpeterian analyses emerged
(e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982, Lall 1983, 1988; Amsden 1989). Therefore, with
evolutionary political economy (EPE) traditions, especially of innovation, a useful
natural experiment of sorts presents itself to scrutiny. In Robert and Yoguel’s
(2016) analysis, the Smith-Marshall-Schumpeter combination in complexity anal-
ysis can lead to two paths—one focused on Knight and Hayek, the other on Young-
Kaldor-Myrdal-Hirschman, with the latter more focused on divergent trajectories.
The nature of evolution as a framework explanation comes under scrutiny because
variety is linked to its explanation of dynamism in development, which in turn the
authors argue is manifested in development’s value priorities. “[..] emphasize that such
value-neutrality requires closer analysis because the neo-Schumpeterian thinkers do
appear to acknowledge that capitalism itself is an uneven, dynamic process of historical
development. Precisely because of this acknowledgement, the relationship between the
vital dynamism of such technological change and the context of its power relations and
values deserves further attention” (Papaioannou and Srinivas 2019). Thus using the
several analytical explanations within the neo-Schumpeterian body of EPE scholarship,
we can probe further for systemic explanations of institutional variety in the building of
technological capabilities (Papaioannou and Srinivas 2019). These can then offer
preliminary assertions about how variety is only “developmental” under certain condi-
tions. Table 2 (Ibid.) demonstrates a range of contention on development and this
institutional variety. Global Value Chains, Innovation Systems (or Systems of Innova-
tion), Sociobiology, “SPRU 1st generation” of evolution and development, and a body
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of literature on Inequality, Innovation and Development (IID), all offer explanations of
why institutional variety exists and, to different degrees, why this matters for
development.
There are several contentious variables among Schumpeterian perspectives. Identi-
fying the agents of importance differentiates Global Value Chains (GVC) I and II
perspectives from other evolutionary scholars such as sociobiologists based on the
developmental attributes of cohesive systems: some GVC studies have differentiated
between labor inequality, wage, health, and safety concerns from those that are focused
on how firms move “higher” through manufacturing value addition in GVCs. The
extent to which firms are studied in wider complex ecosystems affects the nature of
institutional variety as an explanatory variable: “[..] while the creation of variety and
diversity in biology is random in a totally exogenous way, it is within economic
systems partly the result of a division of labor between different firms and other
organizations. This creates interesting coordination problems in resource allocation
and in finding ways to filter an organization’s innovative ideas so that those not being
applied in one organization may be transferred to others” (Andersen 1997). Production
network studies focused on understanding which types of learning are accelerating and
robust, use a range of institutional contrasts. Institutional environments beyond market-
based improvements, such as those including industrial policy, regional production
specialization, global value chains, and global production sharing, can have important
cross-sectoral effects and structural implications such as the impact on smaller firms.
Thus both industry and country learning effects evolve (see Rasiah and Vinanchiarachi
2012; Rasiah et al. 2016).
Similarly, “Inequality, Innovation, Development” (IID) innovation scholars focused
primarily on developing economies tend to identify a wider range of protagonists and
Table 2 Differentiation within neo-Schumpeterian economics paradigm
Innovation “Schools” Sample protagonists
and primary institutions
Broad approach
(Cohesive Systems, CS; Fragmented
Systems, FS), Attention
to explicit development priorities
for innovation
Global Value Chains 1 States, firms, workers,
Standards and Trade
CS, High
Global Value Chains II Firms and their innovation
ecosystems, Standards and
Trade
CS, Low in early studies
Innovation Systems I and II Innovation Systems, firms CS, Low, moderate
Sociobiologists “Agents” individuals, firms,
free markets, intellectual
property regimes.
CS, Low
SPRU 1st generation States, firms FS, High
Inequality, Innovation,
Development (IID)
States, firms, non-profit
organizations, non-state
institutions, democracy
and public reform
FS, High
Source: adapted from Papaioannou and Srinivas (2019)
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wider types of innovation. Their focus is firms and their learning environment.
Institutional variety results in patterns of learning and innovation (“informal”, “below
the radar”, “scarcity-induced”, “bottom of the pyramid”) (Papaioannou and Srinivas
2019). Institutional variety can manifest as a complex analytical challenge of highly
fragmented, unequal and dynamic systems in which states have specific challenges.
Sociobiologists who are equally interested in evolution and innovation make different
choices in primary variables and explanations (Ibid). The fact that different EPE
approaches in the Schumpeterian tradition exist and are consistent with the overarching
framework of innovation studies is unexceptional in itself. However, for the
Schumpeterian EPE tradition to thrive, diverse explanations for institutional variety
must have a methodology to reconcile inferences and judgements.
Single industry analyses are one systematic way to dive deep and explore how
national contexts generate different types of institutional variety and policy for indus-
trial strategies. This is case 3.
4.3 Case 3: Institutional variety in a single industry across “late” industrial nations
Industry growth rates and why they vary sharply differentiates neoclassical versus EPE
explanations. While empirical variations in the sector growth rates are consistent with
growth theories, explanations for the variation reveal fissures in microeconomics
assumptions of how firms learn and the impetus for growth (Nelson and Winter
1974). When diverse institutions in one country become difficult to study, other
approaches are required. Case 3 is single industry-focused to analyze “late” industrial
development.
Single industry explanations often use assertions about knowledge absorption,
innovation, business organizations and public policy in order to explain why one
national industry differs from another. Furthermore, the simple difference between
macroeconomics and microeconomics breaks down when inference about institutional
variety is made more explicit in a single industry. The inference thread that connects
learning to firm behavior and onto industrial organization thus lies at the heart of
several analyses of technological capabilities using EPE including those of neo-
Schumpeterian and Austrian schools and extending to development scholars such as
Myrdal (Robert and Yoguel 2016). The effect of habits and routines can be used to
distinguish the different dynamics of self-organization, cumulative causation, and
feedback (Ibid.). If societies can successfully combine and embed new forms of
knowledge into their firms, other constructs such as innovation, cumulative causation,
or path dependence can explain coordination and novelty in traditions such as neo-
Marxian political economy (e.g., Amsden 1989), emergent knowledge (Metcalfe
2010), technological paradigms (Dosi 1982), or variety and demand (Saviotti 1994,
1996). Some are more “developmental” as case 2 has discussed.
While cross-industry learning offers one way of contrasting countries and thus theoretical
paradigms of development and attendant institutional variety (e.g. Rasiah et al. 2016), single
industry analyses does the same. Single industry analyses thus offer promise for the
institutional context for deployment of instruments of technological advance in “late”
industrial development. For example, procurement in the design of industrial policy plays
an important role in some countries but not others, but can be analyzed further using single
industries. Single industries across countries provide explanations for how learning can be
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more effectively state-led (Lee andMathews 2012). Single industries also demonstrate how
specific policy instruments can dominate or cause havoc. Price regulations in the health
industry for example can rapidly shape an industry’s profile across treatment categories
(Sahu 1998; Chaudhuri 2019), and while advancing the development argument for access
and affordability, can still blunt the learning opportunities within products and across sub-
sectors (Abrol 2004). Furthermore, within the industry, some nations such as Zimbabwe
(Russo and Banda 2015) may use strategic procurement to develop local production
responses to essential medicines such as morphine or antiretrovirals (see Mackintosh et al.
2016). Such EPE-linked analyses, even when amenable to notions of learning and innova-
tion, need to be compared to build more robust inferences and economic judgment.
Taxonomies of institutional variety greatly benefit from detailed, single industry
cases. Instead of fixing on markets or states where nations are separated by “catch-up”
production capabilities, Srinivas (2012) provides a co-evolutionary heuristic of three
separate institutional domains of production, demand, and delivery inwhich institutional
variety is constantly generated and evolving. The domain of production of health
technologies (the R&D, prototyping, manufacture etc.), consumption (though individual
or collective buying instruments), and delivery (e.g., through clinics and hospitals)
offers a conceptual tool to apply co-evolutionary and combinatorial lens to uneven
technological advances over time. It can also reveal the uneven state’s impact in national
histories of the health industry. Other industries such as energy, food production, or
education can also use the heuristic (Fig. 1).
The analytical value of the heuristic makes inferences about how to disentangle “late-
ness” of industrial development. It explicitly acknowledges the time-bound, and thus uneven
nature of the how, why, when of institutional variety. It recognizes combinatorial elements
that separate Germany, India, Brazil, or Cuba, despite impressive histories of pharmaceutical
production, vaccines, or diagnostics capability, but with uneven consumption and delivery
instruments. The heuristic assumes that firm-level analysis of products and processes and
industry-level technology evolution requires a closer scrutiny of the instruments of industrial
policy. Theory builds on differentiation within the three domains where specific institutional
variety is visible. Over time, specific patterns of development become more evident: e.g.,
innovation, proprietary knowledge, stakeholders in rents extraction, and thresholds for state
intervention. The heuristic helps track different national “snapshots” of economic
Fig. 1 Institutional triad
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development and health priorities by analyzing industrial policy design, origin and growth of
competitive export firms, dependence of government revenues on export versus domestic
priorities, or types of scalable innovations (e.g., prosthetics) emerging from outside tradi-
tional R&D labs. Seemingly “comparable” countries on a production analysis (e.g., Brazil or
India) would reveal important differences in other co-evolving dimensions.
The inferences are thus strongly embedded in an evolutionary framework. The
qualitative heuristic asserts that institutional variety in a single industry offers nested
analysis about the nature of EPE and evolution type: nations more successful in one
health sector than others (Institutional variety in health policy); nations more successful
along one triad dimension (Institutional variety within sectors); nations with time-
limited capabilities (Institutional variety over time); nation-states and exogenous factors
especially for export capabilities (Institutional variety within nation-states). Single
industries generate inferences of the type of co-evolution with context-specific and
time-bounded inference about institutional variety’s implications. For example, some
countries may successfully build, but unsuccessfully maintain, vaccines, generic drugs,
and medical device capability. Adapting to growth and maintaining momentum for
learning requires attention to cross-industry and sub-sector regulatory and problem-
solving capacities. The evolutionary sensibility and reflected in the heuristic makes
more visible that technology-focused innovation and learning perspectives in EPE can
be analogous if not strictly comparable to EPE approaches in administrative gover-
nance, policy design, and regulation schools, since these are concerned with how to
enable and coordinate multiple stakeholders, but inevitably move further away from
those schools focused solely on state-led development or determinist assumptions of
technological advance.
4.4 Case 4: Institutional variety and product innovation contexts for learning
As case 3 demonstrated, rather than focus on “optimal” national configurations in industrial
development or claim a solidarity that is elusive as in case 1, it can be helpful to mine single
industry-specific diversity in innovation and learning. Rather than cherry picking or hiding
behind normative notions of industrial development in the health industry, it can help to
make the inferences of institutional variety more visually explicit in development.
Case 4, focused here on innovation in development, is a distinct subset of the techno-
logical capabilities debates of cases 1–3 because its object of enquiry is the innovation
process itself. Institutional variety can explain cross-product and cross-national differences
in the ability to innovate (e.g., prosthetics, water potability, automotive, vaccines). While
production (especially manufacturing) capabilities are robustly analyzed, in fact generating a
substantial body of the early literature of innovation systems and GVCs for example, the
development bias of directionality of innovation remains, i.e., more visible in industrialized
economies. In “Imitation to innovation” (Kim 1997) argued that South Korea’s industrial
transformation rested on technological capabilities built through systematic institutional
efforts of imitation, with a close eye to knowledge systems and technology transfer
established elsewhere, and resulting in “Imitation to Innovation.” Innovation was desirable
but not necessary at the outset, when “imitation” capabilities mattered more. Innovation,
distinctive types of learning and the institutional environments they require locally can clash
with conceptual frameworks and metrics (Arocena and Sutz 2000; Srinivas and Sutz 2008).
For example, that certain types of small firms insert into GVCs despite considerable hurdles
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is now well recognized empirically but absent theoretically, as are studies of certain
geographies with organizational and learning features that may be under-recognized (e.g.,
Kaplinsky 2011; Chataway et al. 2014; Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2019). Even in single
industries (such as in case 3) where the global norms may be well established, specific
types of production and innovation capability, essential to both manufacturing and health
services, are poorly documented and analyzed.
To highlight different types of innovation thus requires a more dynamic taxonomy
through which a firm can “travel,” in turn revealing institutional variety in its environment
as it grows. The figure below provides a taxonomy of four quadrants of innovation using
institutional variety as an explanation that splits the world into advanced industrialized
countries (AICs) and developing countries (DCs) (Srinivas and Sutz 2008). Idiosyncratic,
unexpected, difficult to explain innovation capabilities are the focus and the “clock”
begins for many industrialized countries in the upper left-hand quadrant. This dominant
model includes those nations which are able to be technologically more sophisticated
through trade insertion, adaptation of existing products, and ability to establish self-reliant
production. They may mimic some of the indicators of industrialized nations with formal
R&D labs and large ecosystems of corporate hubs of research or marketing. Alongside,
they may have a smattering of products in other quadrants (Fig 2).
The explanation in this heuristic rests on inferences derived from a two-level
analysis of innovation phenomena observed in developing countries: one level focuses
on cognitive questions of how learning occurs (in firms or other ecosystems of
organizations), the second on structural explanations of national pathways of trade
(make versus buy). The argument is that innovators in developing (industrializing)
countries exist within an industrial landscape dominated by trade with industrial
economies (the upper left-hand quadrant). Combined, the cognitive and structural
Problems for which
solutions have been
found in AICs
Problems for which
solutions have not been
searched or found in AICs
Problems for
which solutions
suitable for ICs
conditions exist
The vast majority of
solutions acquired
through technology
transfer (eventually with
minor modifications)
Solutions to problems
mainly posed in ICs and
developed locally
Problems for
which solutions
suitable for ICs
conditions do
not exist
“Canonical” solutions exist, but 
for different scarcity reasons they 
are not suitable for ICs conditions
No solutions (yet)
Typically health issues
Source: Adapted from Srinivas and Sutz (2008, p. 136)
Fig. 2 The 4 quadrants of a scarcity-induced framework
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features can be represented in 4 quadrants in each of which some types of innovation
occur but which may not always be well-recognized by supportive national and local
development policies. International economic governance especially trade is implicated
here as causing the split between cognitive and structural features. Product “popula-
tions” can be sorted into these 4 quadrants, to separate out those products that may
innovate to serve a local population or solve some especially pressing problem, but may
also generate global pathbreaking science, new materials innovations, or new and rapid
forms of manufacturing innovations.
The framework can be extended to differences between countries based on micro-
level heterogeneity in products. For example, prosthetics production occurs dispropor-
tionately in some countries such as India and has grown from the non-profit, not
business sector in contrast to prosthetics from the U.S. which may have grown in
university-hospital networks. The Jaipur Foot, a product from a non-profit environ-
ment, has now become a global product especially relevant for developing economies.
It has unique characteristics of materials use, customizable design, and available to
adaptation in any number of physical environments. Similarly, an innovative Cuban
vaccine for pediatric meningitis comes from a non-democracy and public sector effort,
with significant innovations in the off-diagonal quadrants. For health innovations, the
heuristic here can be complementary in implications to the single industry-focused
heuristic of case 3 but can challenge it further in cases such as neonatal incubators,
breast cancer diagnostics, and many vaccines. The heuristic’s use forces the framing of
development as historical specificity and path dependency (specialization within quad-
rants) and dynamic (how can firms and an economy adapt and move between quad-
rants). Posed in this manner, inferences can be made more explicit and judgments more
cautious about learning and innovation.
5 Contributions of evolutionary political economy to development
and economics
The preliminary methodology discussed in the prior section laid out 4 separate cases of
the author’s research into development phenomena of technological change. All are
sympathetic to evolutionary political economy, each able to articulate some aspects of
industrial dynamism with innovation and learning. The cases represent persistent and
influential concepts in economic development such as national convergence, growth,
divergence across single industries, and product innovations. The four cases moved
toward the development of taxonomy with propositions or conceptual steps about how
the study of institutional variety can be made more explicit within paradigms, in order
to reveal inference and refine judgment. The cases have been structured as brief
composites and in two instances with visual heuristics, of how “given” development
phenomena such as learning and innovation in industrial development can lead to
diverse inferences and judgements about technological capabilities and their conse-
quences. The appeal to taxonomy recognizes, as the Nyāya school proposes, that
further refinement can offer more explicit relations to develop between those inferences
that convince us versus those that will be needed to convince others. These commu-
nities may be mainstream versus pluralist, neoclassical versus other economics or more
productively, as has been argued in this article, EPE itself.
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The prior sections used qualitative heuristics, shorthands or schematic conceptual
differences, to illustrate 4 preliminary inference categories about technological capabili-
ties. In case 1, the focus was institutional variety situated as historical nation-building in
which the “global South”, “LMICs” or other classifications are labels to explain which
institutional bundles dominate. In case 2, to differentiate among diverse neo-
Schumpeterian frameworks which make different assumptions about institutional variety,
developmental actors, and possible policy priorities. Case 3 focused on single industry and
cross-national analysis, to infer the nature of policy-supports and an evolutionary, histor-
ical timeline to the health industry. While cases 1, 2, 3 have all assumed the nation-state,
other qualitative heuristics as in case 4 can be used in which product innovations become
the unit of analysis and learning and innovation are explicitly discussed as a developmen-
tal goal. Case 4 was used to understand the institutional variety underlying cognitive and
structural facets of learning. Both dominant and neglected product innovations emerge
with policy consequences for make versus buy, and local customization needs. The off-
diagonal elements represent developmental promise but also policy neglect. Cases 3 and 4
lend themselves to potential iterative analysis of origin scenarios and simulation over time.
As cases 2, 3, and 4 imply, institutional variety although often recognized as correlated
to innovation or signaling creativity does not automatically suggest causation. Firms or
other organizations learn and innovate despite or because of institutional variety. Norma-
tive frameworks in economic development and the sub-discipline of development eco-
nomics can thus implicitly favor those states and economies which appear to mimic
industrial economies with a limited institutional palette, and overly rely on evaluation of
traditional indicators such as size of firm, R&D investments, or patents. The inference
underlying such analysis and interpretation of the history of economic thought is that those
economies thrive which are able to convert and coordinate institutional variety to eco-
nomic growth and dynamism. However, the inference about the phenomena of institu-
tional variety can have distinctly different implications for the building of technological
capabilities in economic development. One inference is that institutional variety (“too
many ways of doing things”) can degenerate into disorder and inconsequential or
fragmented knowledge; another might be that such variety could be a hallmark of
creativity and innovation. Furthermore, as single sector cases show, the many different
ways of technologically advancing might remain difficult to corral into single explana-
tions. As cases 3 and 4 demonstrate in different ways, if the evolutionary analysis is taken
further, a single aspect of the co-evolution or of activity within a quadrant reflects a given
(and intermediary) institutional combination, not a certain outcome. An iterative, simula-
tion lens if applied, would show that the off-diagonal lens might be the most promising for
development, but the most ignored by policy design. It is clear from the different
developmental judgements, which can only be discussed here in brief, that reconciliation
must trace back to more overt deliberation on inference. Such deliberation will require
more explicit attempts to improve methods (even in these cases) that can contribute to
more systematic cross-EPE theories and evidence of learning and innovation.
Rather than be overly concerned with responding exclusively to dominant para-
digms of innovation or learning, one must return to observation: If variety is considered
a theoretical centerpiece, how does one order this variety? Is institutional variety more
or less strictly tied to representing variation and implications for selection and retention/
replication in the VSR framework? Order can be described in terms of coordination
challenges versus the need for attending to change dynamics (Dosi and Orsenigo 1988),
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and its theoretical solidity able to address industrial dynamics and structural change
(Nelson and Winter 1982; Silverberg et al. 1988). At the same time, meta-frameworks
and themes become important points of difference among the evolutionary traditions.
Variety is one of these, which can be captured in terms of its evolutionary attributes in
different ways (see Robert et al. 2017). “The dimension micro heterogeneity considers
two attributes: the differentiating strategies of agents endowed with creative capacity,
and heterogeneity derived from learning and adaptation processes in different evolu-
tionary paths. The former is less mentioned than the last one in the average.” (Robert
et al. 2017). But micro-heterogeneity can be countered by other explanations of neo-
Schumpeterian analysis such as emergent properties or network architecture that
themselves possess different ontological assumptions about evolution and therefore
the impact on innovation research.
Evolutionary political economy (EPE) traditions offer some promise for the resolution of
this debate.What we “see” as given in development is what we have inferred from specific
phenomena through conceptual frameworks in economics. The challenge is that paradigms
of technological learning and innovation may not always be commensurate across the
discipline nor the inferences and judgments easily reconciled. These ontological differences
within the evolutionary traditions ofwider evolutionary political economy (EPE) can benefit
from resolution within the traditions themselves if economics is to advance, rather than be
overly concerned about the boundaries of the discipline which will be continually redrawn
in any case. “Inclusion and exclusion are not so much the unambiguous outcomes of settled
conflicts as they are the weapons and the stakes in an ongoing manifest or latent confron-
tation. The definition of the battlefield and of the admissible participants are both stakes and
weapons.” (Baumberger 1977, 13). To avoid a normative slant toward a universal optimum
or of convergent innovation patterns common within mainstream enquiry, recognition of
variety within and across such “systems” and their relational components of actors and
organizations, becomes both a core focus for development analysis and a policy subject in
itself (Arocena and Sutz 2000). For example, all 4 cases successively build on the question
of the “ex-post” nature of development theories and lend well to notions of fragmented and
divergent development which have important implications for evolutionary economics and
political economy. The different traditions of fragmented, divergent evolutionary attributes
constitute scholars with different interests in innovation for development, where consider-
able dissent exists in whether innovation is best exemplified within existing industrial
traditions or not (Papaioannou and Srinivas 2019). Rather than fighting the internecine
warfare of economics against economics, the Nyaya School and its reasoning techniques
reminds us that attention to intra-paradigmatic inquiry allows greater refinement of both
inclusion and difference of perspective on institutional variety and generates conditional
knowledge essential to strengthen the discipline.
Evolutionary political economy (EPE) represents an important disciplinary opportunity
to advance inter- and intra-paradigmatic thinking. As we have argued, if development
economics is seen as the analysis of development phenomena, then a more overt process of
inference is necessary to understand the range and consequences of institutional variety as a
set of empirical phenomena. Theoretical frameworks within EPE that follow from such
inferences can better explain institutional variety’s impact on the how, when, and why of
technological capabilities in economic development. Without this, economics remains with
a scientific challenge regarding its sources of knowledge, its hidden inferences, and its
judgments of institutional variety in development and how to respond.
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